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I. Introduction
This paper aims to sort out a Confucian view of “toleration”, mainly 
focusing on two of the pre-Qin Confucian cardinal classics, namely, The 
Analects and Mencius. Basing on the analysis within the Confucian context, 
this paper also tries to give a further analysis of “toleration” beyond the 
Confucian context itself. 
There are diverse understandings of the meaning of “toleration”. 
Michael Walzer deﬁ nes “toleration” mainly in the sense of inter-communal 
relationship: “a peaceful coexistence of groups of people with different 
histories, cultures, and identities”. (Walzer, 1997:2) In this paper, however, 
toleration refers to a peaceful coexistence both in the senses of persons 
and communities, in the situation of diﬀ erences. 
The Confucian idea of “a harmony in differences” (he er bu tong) 
resembles Walzer’s understanding of “toleration”. In Analects 13:23, 
Confucius states that “the exemplary persons (Junzi) seek a harmony in 
diﬀ erences”. It means that when facing diﬀ erences̶which can be diﬀ erent 
personalities, opinions, and ways of life and so on̶exemplary persons can 
still sustain a harmonious relationship among each other. According to the 
basic Confucian analogy of individuals to communities, this ideal mode of 
interpersonal relationship can be legitimately applied to the relationship 
between diﬀ erent communities, which are composed of individual persons. 
That is to say, when there are diﬀ erences among diﬀ erent communities̶
299
資料および配布資料
300
生存学研究センター報告4
which can be diﬀ erent histories, cultures and so on̶these communities 
can sustain a peaceful and harmonious relationship. In a word, both in the 
senses of interpersonal relationship and the relationship of communities, 
“harmony in differences” can be understood as an ideal of Confucian 
toleration. I agree with Walzer and take the following argument as a 
preposition in this paper: “Peaceful coexistence is always a good thing”. 
(Walzer, 1997: 2) However, can this ideal mode of toleration̶“a harmony in 
diﬀ erences” actually be achieved in the Confucian context? To what extent 
can it be approached and where do the limits lie? From a contemporary 
perspective, is it possible to break through these limits and how? In the 
second section, I will discuss the reasons that underpin “a harmony in 
differences” in the Confucian context. Then in the third section, I will 
analyze what Confucianism cannot tolerate and the possible reasons. 
Finally, in the fourth section, I will discuss toleration beyond the Confucian 
context.  
II. The Confucian “Harmony in Diﬀ erences”
Toleration often connects with differences, because if there are no 
diﬀ erences, there will be no oppositions and nothing to tolerate. Therefore, 
toleration can often be understood as a certain attitude or practices 
toward diﬀ erences. Understood as an attitude, toleration can be ranked as 
a continuum.  
In Analects, there are cases when there is a very positive attitude 
toward differences. For example, Confucius said, “When I walk along 
with two others, I am bound to ﬁ nd a teacher.” (Analects 7:22) It can be 
interpreted like this: one can always learn something from someone who 
is different from oneself. Rather than ignoring and avoiding differences, 
one can positively consider differences to be sources of inspiration and 
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improvement. This state of mind is similar to one of the possibilities of 
toleration Walzer describes, which is “openness to the others; curiosity; 
perhaps even respect, a willingness to listen and learn.” (Walzer, 1997:11) 
What underlies this particular attitude is a positive recognition of the 
existence and equal status of a diﬀ erent other, which can be a diﬀ erent 
person or something else. 
There are specific cases when the principle of “a harmony in 
differences” is carried out. In Analects, Confucius makes comments to 
many ﬁ gures, some of which are given very high judgment, even if they 
are not Confucians in many ways. A historical figure Confucius often 
mentions is Guanzhong. On the one hand, he criticizes Guanzhong for his 
inobservance of proper rituals (li) (Analects 3:22); while on the other hand, he 
highly praises Guanzhong as possessing the virtue of humaneness (ren)（1）, 
because he exerted a great inﬂ uence on bringing order to the empire and 
thus secured many people’s lives (Analects 14:16, 14:17). For Confucius, who 
highly emphasizes proper rituals, Guanzhong is not a person who perfectly 
conforms to the Confucian norms and hence differs from the ideal 
Confucian model. However, because of his great deed in saving people’s 
lives, which is an important part? of the understanding of “humaneness” 
as “to love people” (Analects 12:22), he can deﬁ nitely be tolerated and his 
status is by no means inferior to Confucians.   
Differences are sometimes just diversity in the surface, while they 
share a same foundation. In Mencius, Boyi, Yiyin and Liu Xiahui are 
three ﬁ gures Mencius often mentions. Boyi “abode in an inferior situation, 
and would not, with his virtue, serve a degenerate prince.” Yiyin “five 
times went to Tang, and ﬁ ve times went to Jie” (who is one of the most 
notorious tyrants in Chinese history). And, Liu Xiahui “did not disdain to 
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serve a vile prince, nor did he decline a small oﬃ  ce”. Thus, these three 
persons pursued their aim in very different or even opposed courses. 
However, these differences are not as crucial as it seems and can be 
tolerated, because the aim of the three was one, which is to achieve the 
virtue of “humaneness”. Mencius comments that on the same foundation of 
“humaneness”, the diﬀ erences in the means and courses are not a problem 
at all and can thus be tolerated. (Mencius 12:6)   
Sometimes, disputes are inevitably caused by the diﬀ erences. When 
disputes arise, the influence of “virtue (de)” is highly advocated and 
regarded as the most proper and eﬀ ective solution. Mencius says, “When 
one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts’ core they are pleased, and 
sincerely submit, as was the case with the seventy disciples in their 
submission to Confucius.” (Mencius 3:3) To a great extent, this solution 
resembles a “fair play” in virtues: in situation of opposition and disputes, 
no matter how diverse the competitors’ backgrounds are, the one who has 
a greater virtue power would “win”. This also entails that when facing 
opposition and disputes; one should concentrate more on a self-reﬂ ection 
on her own doings and then a self-improvement of her virtue, instead of 
focusing on opposed others’ faults and problems. In this way, hostility 
and aggression caused by diﬀ erences can be alleviated. In the Confucian 
context, this thinking is also being applied to the inter-communal 
relationship. 
The power of virtue, instead of arms, is emphasized and promoted 
in the situation of disputes between two communities. “If remoter people 
are not submissive, all the inﬂ uences of civil culture and virtue are to be 
cultivated to attract them to be so” (Analects 16:1). “Remoter people” refer 
to people in other communities.  Compared to a resort to sword and ﬁ re, 
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the emphasis of moral power’s inﬂ uence is a more tolerant way to resolve 
communal disputes. 
III. What Can Not Be Tolerated
The section II points out where a harmony in diﬀ erences is possible in 
the Confucian context. In this section, I will provide cases to analyze the 
boundary of toleration in the Confucian context.
Not all kinds of differences can be tolerated and harmonized in 
Confucian context, since many diﬀ erences are morally ranked. Sometimes 
it is necessary to avoid the diﬀ erences, if they are considered as morally 
injurious. Confucius says that if the heresies (doctrines which deviate from 
what is considered as morally right) are attacked, the harm to the society 
would cease.（2） (Analects 2:16) 
However, what specific kinds of differences are considered as 
harmful and thus can not be tolerated? I will argue that when there is 
no consensus in regarding “ﬁ lial love (xiao)” as the fundamental value, a 
certain “other” can not be tolerated in the Confucian context.
Confucius’ judgments of one of his disciples̶Zaiwo to some extent 
can help illustrate the point. There is a famous dialogue between the 
two about the “three years’ mourning for parents”. In Zaiwo’s opinion, 
the period of three years is too long in the sense that the observances of 
rituals would be ruined and the social production would be abandoned. 
In a word, the social order and public interest would be harmed, and 
thus the period of three years should be curtailed to only one year. Just 
because of this point of view, Confucius criticizes Zaiwo as not humane (bu 
ren), which is a very harsh critique in the Confucian context. However, in 
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fact, the disagreement between them  is not about whether ﬁ lial love is 
something one should value̶Zaiwo does not deny it (and what he denies 
is the authority of a particular length of the mourning period)̶but about 
whether it ought to be regarded as a supreme value: for Confucius, even 
though in the three years’ period, other social goodness would be harmed; 
a truly ﬁ lial  child would not consider it at all, because nothing is more 
important than the full performance of ﬁ lial love. In this case, moreover, 
even if one considers Zaiwo to be unfilial merely according to his 
opposition to the three years’ mourning for parents, it will only follow that 
he should be criticized as being unﬁ lial. However, he is labeled as being 
not humane in Confucius’ last comment. That is to say, for Confucius, to be 
unﬁ lial, or strictly speaking, the non-recognition of ﬁ lial love as a supreme 
value means being not humane. Here, ﬁ lial love, instead of humaneness, 
essentially constitutes the foundation of toleration.
One may find that Mencius can not tolerate Mozi for the similar 
reason. Mencius abuses Mozi as a beast and takes it to be his mission 
to get rid of Mozi’s doctrine, which advocates a “universal love (jian ai)”
. (Mencius 6:9) Obviously, a harmony in diﬀ erences is impossible between 
Mencius and Mozi, even though Mencius realizes that for Mozi, “if by 
rubbing smooth his whole body from the crown to the heel, he could have 
benefited the kingdom, he would have done it.” (Mencius 13:26) Why? 
Because there is a fundamental disagreement between the two doctrines 
about whether the particular love toward one’s parents, and for Mencius, 
ﬁ lial love ought to be taken as a supreme value, which is superior to a 
universal love toward human beings. 
Generally speaking, what both Confucius and Mencius can not 
tolerate in interpersonal relationship is the denial of filial love as a 
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supreme value. In other words, filial love is essentially the foundation 
for Confucian toleration. The way of thinking is similar when Confucians 
consider the relationship between the communities. Communities with a 
culture recognizing and promoting the value of ﬁ lial love can be tolerated; 
otherwise, there can be no toleration.
In the Confucian context, there is a specific differentiation between 
two distinct communities̶“the barbarian nations” (yi, di) and “our great 
nation” (xia). Essentially, this is not a geographical differentiation, but 
a cultural one. The culture of “the barbarian nations” does not share a 
dominant Confucian feature, in the sense that they do not regard the 
ﬁ lial love as a key value in their societies. For Confucians, because of this 
cultural diﬀ erence, “the barbarian nations” are culturally inferior to “our 
great nation”. Confucius says that though “the barbarian tribes” have their 
own rulers, they are not “as viable as the various Chinese states without 
them”（3） (Analects 3:5), because even the various Chinese states had no 
rulers, they still had an order of family which is sustained by ﬁ lial love.  
Basing on the point that “the barbarian nations” do not have a culture 
highly values the ﬁ lial love; there seems even a generalization in Confucian 
context that they are inferior in every aspect. The customs such as 
“wearing unbound hair” and “the lappets of the coats buttoning on the 
left side” in “the barbarian nations” is unbearable. (Analects 14:17) Mencius 
denies the possibility of a mutual learning between “our great nation” and 
“the barbarian nations”: only the latter must imitate and learn from the 
former’s culture; while there is nothing worthy for the former to learn 
from the latter. He says, “I have heard of men using the doctrines of our 
great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being 
changed by barbarians.” Moreover, if the “barbarians”’ cultures and ways 
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of life are followed, that change is deﬁ nitely not a good one. (Mencius 5:4) 
To sum up, when Confucians take “filial love” as the foundation of 
toleration, they are less likely to treat those “dissidents”̶who deny ﬁ lial 
love as the fundamental value̶as equals and more likely to regard them 
as morally and culturally inferior, thus the possibility of toleration is 
decreased.  
IV. Beyond Confucianism?
In the sections above, I provide an analysis of Confucian ideal of 
toleration, about its possibility and also its limits. It follows that the 
Confucian toleration is only possible on the basis of the recognition of ﬁ lial 
love, which is a core value for Confucianism. The “others” who neglect 
and deny the foundation of ﬁ lial love can not be tolerated in the Confucian 
context. 
It can be argued that the toleration discussed above is mostly in the 
sense of an attitude, while not in the sense of actions or practices. The 
reason is that Confucianism was only one of the “one hundred schools” 
at that time. It neither has a dominant influence over other schools, 
nor any critical political influence. However, after a few hundred years, 
especially after the implement of the policy of “dismissing other schools 
and promoting Confucianism ( 罢黜 百 家， 独 尊 儒术 )” in Han dynasty, 
Confucianism has become a dominant ideology and exerted a powerful 
and everlasting influence in real life political practices. Since then, the 
Confucian toleration was not only in the sense of attitude, but also actions. 
Historically, the toleration toward different schools was dramatically 
declined. Also, the toleration toward “the barbarian nations” was seriously 
decreased.
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Now, considering the issue of toleration beyond the Confucian 
context, can we also get some inspiration? How is toleration or “harmony 
in diﬀ erences” or “peaceful coexistence” possible? Though I take it as a 
preposition in this paper that toleration is a good thing, it does not entail 
that a standpoint of relativism is endorsed nor any kind of difference 
is celebrated. Quite contrary, I agree with Walzer that “to argue that 
diﬀ erent groups and or/individuals should be allowed to coexist in peace 
is not to argue that every actual or imaginable differences should be 
tolerated.” (Walzer, 1997:6) Toleration is a principled attitude or practice, 
which has its foundation. However, what ought to and can be the right 
foundation for toleration? This huge issue is beyond the task of this paper. 
But, if we combine the Confucian context and take it as a particular case, 
the inspiration may be that when human equality is better recognized and 
respected, there is more room for peaceful toleration: when Confucianism 
regards “humaneness” as the foundation, more openness is given toward 
diﬀ erences, because under this circumstance, there is no sharp distinction 
about who is superiror or inferior. While when Confucianism bases 
toleration exclusively on the foundation of its particular value̶“ﬁ lial love”, 
it more easily turns out to be an authoritarian way of thinking, which 
considers itself to be the only standard and the different others to be 
inferior in status. Thus, the peaceful coexistence is seriously challenged
̶dissidents are called “beasts”, which is deprived of human dignity, and 
communities with other cultures are despised as uncivilized and inferior 
by the significant and dominant culture. From a contemporary point 
of view, the respect of human equality is best outlined by Taylor as 
recognition and respect of “a universal potential” “for forming and deﬁ ning 
one’s own identity, as an individual and also as a culture.” (Taylor,1992: 42)
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Notes
（1） In this paper, I translate the Confucian notion of “ren” as humane (adjective) or 
humaneness (noun) or humane person (noun) according to diﬀ erent contexts.
（2） This is my own translation, according to Yang Bojun’s Chinese translation. There 
is also another kind of interpretation, as Legge provides, “The study of strange 
doctrines is injurious indeed!” The diﬀ erence of the two translation is caused by the 
diﬀ erence understanding of the character “gong”, which in the former is understood 
as “attack”, while in the latter as “study”. However, I think this diﬀ erence in the 
understanding of this chapter is not crucial in the whole argument, because either 
translation argues that heterodox doctrine is harmful to some extent.
（3） This translation is borrowed from Roger Ames.
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